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Abstract 
 
In this paper we develop a mobilisation analysis of contemporary antagonism to 
immigrants. We argue that such antagonism does not arise spontaneously from the 
cognitions of ordinary people but is mobilised by political actors. This leads us to ask 
why politicians mobilise such antagonisms and how they do so. Our analysis, 
illustrated by set piece speeches on immigration by the four main UK party political 
leaders in the period prior to the 2015 elections, suggests (a) that while these speeches 
are ostensibly about an intergroup issue they equally serve intra-group dynamics, 
notably demonstrating how the speaker serves national interests and hence qualifies to 
serve as a national representative; (b) the way that speakers mobilise antagonism to 
immigrants is through construing a variety of forms of threat: spatial threat, economic 
threat, security threat and diversity threat. We focus particularly on the last of these 
because of the ways in which it invokes social psychological arguments and hence 
speaks in our name. We conclude by raising issues of accountability – both of 
politicians and social psychologists – regarding the way we talk about immigration. 
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Introduction 
Immigration and Integration 
In his 1979 book, The Nature of Mass Poverty, John Kenneth Galbraith wrote: 
“Migration is the oldest action against poverty. It selects those who most want help. It 
is good for the country to which they go; it helps to break the equilibrium of poverty 
in the country from which they come. What is the perversity in the human soul that 
causes people to resist so obvious a good” (p. 7). 
 
Where Galbraith argues for migration as an economic good, this is echoed in the 
official position of the European Union. Free movement of labour across country 
boundaries is heralded as one of the greatest achievements of the EU by the European 
Commission (EC, 2011). It is both an antecedent and an accomplishment of European 
integration. It serves to overcome both disparities of wealth and political/cultural 
differences It is thereby fundamental to integrating people together within a common 
European citizenship (Joannin, 2014). 
 
Where Galbraith observes that perverse fears surrounding migration can serve to 
undermine integration, this too is echoed within the EU. In August 2015, German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel suggested that ability to deal with migration placed the 
very existence of the European Union in question (Barkin, 2016). Merkel’s focus was 
on migration from non-member states into the EU. For many others, though, the 
concern was with free movement within Europe, especially following the accession of 
the A8 countries (a group of eight Eastern European countries) in May 2004.  
 
Opposition to such movement has been integral to the growth of populist anti-
European parties across the continent in recent years (Stockemer, 2016; see also 
Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018). It has been key to the rise of Orban in Hungary 
(Postelnicescu, 2016), of the Law and Justice Party in Poland (Adekoya, 2017), and 
the Conte government in Italy (Depetris, 2018). Moreover, the anti-immigration 
policies of such governments once is power has been a major source of tensions 
between states in Europe, with open hostility between Italy and France over the 
treatment of migrants (Henley, Giuffrida & Connolly, 2018) and formal 
condemnation of Hungary by the European Parliament (Rankin, 2018). 
 
Opposition to migration, then, is at the root of threats to European integration, both 
directly (by limiting free movement) and indirectly (by sustaining political forces that 
are both anti-European and which creates conflicts amongst European states). 
Nowhere is this more obvious than in the UK where opposition to immigration was 
central both to the rise of UKIP (Dennison & Goodwin, 2015) and to the vote to leave 
the EC in June 2016. (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017).  
 
Mobilising opposition to immigration 
So, to borrow from Galbraith, what ‘perversity’ explains such trenchant opposition to 
immigration? It does not seem to be derived from direct experience of incomers. 
Indeed areas that voted most heavily for BREXIT were those with low immigration 
rates (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). As Bobby Duffy of the polling organisation IPSOS-
MORI argued, fear of immigration drove the leave victory – not immigration itself 
(cited in Travis, 2016). 
 
Moreover, such a pattern is repeated in Germany (Mudde, 2017) and Chile (Gonzales 
et al., 2017). It seems that anti-immigrant views derive less from what people directly 
see of immigrants than what it communicated to them about immigrants. Their 
understandings are not a matter of perception but of mobilisation. Our understandings 
of these understandings then require us to look as much at the mobilisers as the 
mobilised.  
 
Some 30 years ago, Miles & Phizacklea (1987) showed how post-war political debate 
in the UK was characterised by a shift from dissensus to consensus about the 
problems of immigration and the need for immigration control. That has become more 
entrenched ever since with all sides in the BREXIT debate united on the need to limit 
free movement with Labour in particular apologising for its previous support for A8 
immigration and describing such policy as a ‘spectacular mistake’ (Hasan, 2014). 
Clearly, this unified political voice is a key factor in explaining how people 
understand immigration. 
 
In this paper, we seek to examine the role of contemporary politicians in evoking 
opposition to a Europe of free movement. Of course, we are not the first to focus on 
this role. Many scholars across a range of disciplines (political sciences, history, 
economics) have shown that leaders routinely employ anti-immigrant rhetoric (e.g. 
Bailey, 2008; Engel, 2010; Statham, 2003) and that such rhetoric is effective in 
mobilising public antagonism (e.g. Bohman, 2011; Brader, Valentino & Suhay, 
2008).  
 
They have also addressed the reasons why political leaders use such rhetoric and 
hence when they do so. Notably, it is argued that invoking danger from outgroups –
specifically immigrant groups – creates unity and outlaws dissent (Bailey, 2008; 
Engel, 2010) and also serves to discredit opponents whose policies favour that 
outgroup (Glaeser, 2005). As a consequence, leaders are more likely to talk of 
dangerous outgroups – specifically, dangerous immigrants – when they are weak, 
threatened by rivals or lacking in legitimacy (Elcheroth & Reicher, 2017; Tir & 
Jasinski, 2008). 
 
Our aim is to add a psychological dimension to this debate. On the one hand we take 
these leadership considerations into the psychology of immigration and of intergroup 
hostility more generally where they are notably lacking. That is, psychologists tend to 
study how people form prejudices against outgroups in an unmediated way - as if they 
arise spontaneously from the way people perceive their social world. We propose to 
complement this focus with a mediated or ‘mobilisation’ perspective which asks how 
understandings of immigration depend on the explanatory resources provided for 
them (cf. Elcheroth & Reicher, 2017; Reicher, 2007, 2012). 
 
On the other hand, our ‘mobilisation’ perspective provides psychological insight into 
the role of leadership in generating antipathy to immigrants. We do this in two ways. 
First, when it comes to why leaders invoke such antipathy, existing analyses tend to 
assume that this will increase their popularity and influence without addressing the 
processes by which this might occur.  We draw on recent models of identity 
leadership (Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2011), particularly as they apply to political 
leadership and authority (Reicher, Haslam & Platow, 2014), in order to address this 
issue. 
 These models propose that authority resides in being seen to be representative of the 
group, to be acting for the group and to be realising group goals. Leaders, that is, 
present themselves and their views not in individual terms but as the reflection of a 
generalised public that they seek to represent (cf. Mahendran, 2018). One of the most 
effective ways of achieving authority, then, is to be seen to be defending the group 
against threats, especially threats to the very existence of the group. By identifying a 
threat (especially one which is not recognised by ones rivals), and by proposing 
strong actions against that group (especially actions which go beyond those proposed 
by ones rivals) one is in a position to claim to be a distinctive champion of ‘the 
people’. What looks like an inter-group phenomenon is therefore best viewed as 
deriving from struggles over intra-group power and influence (Elcheroth & Reicher, 
chapter 6). 
 
In a world of nation states, where voting is based on a national franchise and where 
political power depends upon being seen to represent the national interest, the 
identification of an immigration threat becomes a particularly potent way of arguing 
that one is attuned to, concerned with and effective in advancing the national interest. 
Consequently, one would expect anti-immigration political discourse to be directed 
towards demonstrating these characteristics as well as in characterising the 
phenomenon itself. We investigate whether this is so and how it is accomplished. 
 
Our second contribution concerns the question of how politicians mobilise antipathy 
to immigration, we have already addressed this to some extent, focussing on fear: that 
is, the way in which immigrants are constituted as a threat. The psychological 
literature has drilled into this idea in some depth. It has examined the relationship 
between outgroup threat and prejudice both in general (e.g. Stephan & Stephan, 2000) 
and specifically in relation to immigration (Quillian, 1995, see also Mitzen & Bially 
Mattern, 2018). Moreover it has distinguished between different types of threat, 
notably separating out ‘realistic’ threats to the safety and material well-being of a 
group and ‘symbolic’ threats to the integrity of a group culture or identity (Jetten, 
Ryan & Mols, 2017; Riek, Mania & Gaertner, 2006). We wish to examine the types 
of threat that are used by politicians in anti-immigrant discourse. But, in doing so, we 
also want to raise some issues about the way threat itself is conceptualised. 
 Rather than using the ‘realistic’/’symbolic’ distinction, our own surveys of the 
historical literature suggests an alternative distinction between ‘existential’ threats 
which put the very existence of the ingroup in question and ‘non-existential threats’ 
which might compromise the standing of the group (either symbolic or material) but 
which leave it intact. We find that the former are particularly powerful in generating 
outgroup antipathy. Indeed most forms of genocide are premised on the notion that 
we must eliminate the other in order to survive (Herf, 2008; Reicher, Haslam & Rath, 
2008). So to what extent are existential and non-existential threat discourses found in 
mainstream anti-immigration political speech? 
 
In addition, there is one other type of threat discourse which particularly interests us 
as social psychologists because it rests on a specifically social psychological premise 
– namely that diversity destroys social cohesion. Thus, as the argument goes, 
immigration leads people to lose a sense of community, to stop seeing their 
neighbours as ‘one of us’ and hence to be less willing to act in ways that support the 
entire community, such as paying into a redistributive tax system (Collier, 2013; 
Goodhart, 2014).  
 
Once again, we are interested in whether anti-immigration political discourse employs 
such arguments. To the extent that it does, then this places the relationship between 
social psychology and the immigration debate on a whole new footing. We are no 
longer simply outsiders looking in on the debate and applying our analytic tools to it. 
We become part of the debate itself and cannot interrogating the validity of the 
discourse. In such a situation, silence implies acceptance. 
 
The present study 
We address the issues raised above in the context of the run-up to the 2015 British 
general election. Before the poll, immigration was seen as the most important issue, 
alongside healthcare  (Statista, 2014) and after the poll it was seen as the most 
important issue in deciding the outcome, alongside the economy and healthcare (Ipsos 
MORI, 2015).   
 
Our focus is on key ‘set-piece’ speeches given by the leaders of the four major British 
political parties, Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats and UK Independence 
Party (UKIP). Accordingly, we omit the Scottish National Party – not because it lacks 
significance (indeed it has more members than some of the other and has more MPs 
returned at the election) but because it campaigns specifically in Scotland rather than 
across the UK. 
 
We focus on speeches rather than, say, party manifestos (which could be seen to be 
the best and most comparable indicator of a party’s position on immigration), because 
very few people read manifestos (BMG, 2017) or update their political views from 
them. Instead, they rely on a wider information environment, including the speeches 
of party elites (Adams, Ezrow & Somer-Topcu, 2011; 2014). 
 
What is more, we employ an analysis of single speeches by the party leaders, rather 
than a general analysis of all the speeches by party elites in the run up to elections, 
because of our interest - at this stage of our research - in the various ways in which 
speakers construe their own relationship, and that of immigrants, to their audience. 
Our focus for now is on mapping the various types category relations involved and 
the ways these are constituted. This requires a qualitative approach involving thick 
description rather than a quantitative approach which would require category relations 
that had been defined a priori (cf. Urla, 1993). It is the approach we and others have 
taken in  previous studies mapping category construction (e.g. Reicher & Hopkins, 
1996; 2001; Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert Hopkins & Levine, 2006)  
 
To recap, we analyse party leaders speeches in order to provide psychological insights 
into why and how politicians mobilise opposition to immigration. Within the ‘why’ 
we are interested in whether and in what ways leaders attempt to establish that they, 
and they alone, represent the group, act for the group and realise group goals. Within 
the ‘how’ we are interested in the use of different types of threat discourse, 
particularly the use of ‘existential’ and ‘non-existential threats’ and also the use of 
psychologically based ‘cohesion threat’ arguments. 
 
Method 
Choice of speeches 
Our choice of speech for each leader was guided by three criteria: 
1. In each case the party itself trailed the speeches in advance as significant 
position pieces which defined the party policy on immigration.  
2. In each case it was made clear within the speech itself that the speaker 
was laying out the party position on immigration 
3. In each case, the speech hit the news headlines and was treated as a 
significant statement of the party position on immigration. 
 
The four speeches we analysed were as follows1: 
 David Cameron (Conservative Party): Speaking on November 28th 2014 at a 
JCB factory in Rochester, Staffordshire 
 Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrats): Speaking on August 5th 2014 in London 
 Nigel Farage (UKIP): Speaking on March 4th 2015 in London 
 Ed Miliband (Labour Party): Speaking on December 15th 2014 in Great 
Yarmouth 
 
Method 
The analytic procedure we used in this study is akin to thematic analysis (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). We proceeded in two phases, relating to our two broad research 
questions. 
 
In relation to why politicians take anti-immigration positions, we read through each 
transcript, looking for all instances where the speaker defined the categorical nature of 
their audience and invoked (a) either their own or their rivals relationship to this 
                                                 
1 The full texts of the Cameron, Clegg and Miliband speeches are all available online 
(respectively: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-30250299; 
https://www.libdemvoice.org/in-full-nick-cleggs-immigration-speech-successful-
immigration-systems-have-to-be-managed-41969.html; 
https://labourlist.org/2014/12/we-will-control-immigration-with-fair-rules-miliband-
announces-labours-second-election-pledge/ ). The text of the Farage speech was 
transcribed from a video on youtube: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OSB0JoMO0S4  
 
category; (b) how either their own or their rivals approach to immigration was based 
on the categorical interest; (c) how either their own or their rivals approach to 
immigration was effective in promoting the categorical interest.  
 
In relation to how politicians invoke anti-immigration positions, we re-read the 
transcripts, this time looking for all instances which constitute reasons why 
immigration should be viewed as negative, should be controlled and/or limited. In 
particular, we looked for the different ways in which immigration should be viewed 
as a threat and we specifically coded for any arguments which base the nature of the 
threat on psychological arguments (e.g. diversity will undermine group identity and/or 
group cohesion). Note here, we do not include here arguments which relate to the 
consequences of the threat rather than the threat itself. Thus, for instance, to argue that 
an economic threat (say, loss of jobs) will lead to anger and fear that will disrupt 
society would not be included here. 
 
Analysis 
The ‘why’: outgroup antagonism and ingroup authority 
We have referred to the leaders speeches as ‘anti-immigration’ speeches (not least 
because they themselves describe the speeches as about controlling or limiting 
immigration). Our concern has been with opposition to rather than support for 
immigration. Yet all four speeches started by emphasising that immigrants are a boon. 
The similarity of the speeches in this regard - despite the profound political 
differences between speakers  - was particularly striking: 
 
Q1 David Cameron: 
Our openness is part of who we are… we must never give in to those who would 
throw away our values, with the appalling prospect of repatriating migrants who are 
here totally legally and have lived here for years. We are Great Britain because of 
immigration, not in spite of it. 
 
Q2 Nick Clegg: 
When Britain hosted the Olympics, we welcomed in the world and we revelled in our 
diversity. Our heritage is a glorious patchwork of different cultures and influences. 
My mother is Dutch. My father’s mother a Russian émigré. My wife, Spanish. I am 
like millions of British citizens whose roots can be traced around the globe.  
 
Q3 Nigel Farage: 
My family were migrants, in fact I think in modern parliaments they would be 
refugees. They were protestants from France... And perhaps we could move on to the 
early 1970s when there was a big debate in Britain over, could we accommodate the 
Ugandan Asians? The people that Amin was threatening to kill, the debate, could we 
accommodate 28000 people? And we did, and they turned out to be one of the most 
successful migrant groups ever to come to this country. 
 
Q4 Ed Miliband: 
I am the son of immigrants, parents who came here as refugees fleeing from the 
Nazis. I am incredibly grateful and proud that Britain enabled my parents to build a 
home here and have a family. They worked hard and made their contribution to this 
country. And I am proud of the contribution that immigrants of all origins, races and 
faiths have made to Britain over the years.  
 
In each case, then, the speaker declares that the UK is (a) a country constituted 
through immigration; (b) a country that is favourable to immigration, and; (c) a 
country that has benefitted by immigration. To ground their personal pro-immigrant 
credentials, it is notable how three of the four foreground their own immigrant 
connections – either by descent or by marriage.  
 
The only exception is Cameron who has no such resources in his personal history to 
draw on and therefore, in his full speech, devotes more time that the others in 
stressing the contribution of Jewish migrants, West Indian migrants and, most 
particularly, the migrants who were critical in the iconic ‘Battle of Britain’: “We will 
never forget the Polish and Czech pilots who helped save this country in its hour of 
need”. 
 
Having constructed the nation and the self  in pro-immigrant terms, all four speakers 
then take two further steps. The first is to declare that the population (more than 
themselves) see contemporary immigration as a problem. The second is to insist that 
they and their party are distinctive in providing an effective response to this concern. 
Let us look at each in turn.  
 
On contemporary immigration being a problem perceived by the population: 
 
Q5 David Cameron: 
People have understandably become frustrated. It boils down to one word: control. 
People want Government to have control over the numbers of people coming here and 
the circumstances in which they come, both from around the world and from within 
the European Union.  
 
Q6 Nick Clegg: 
Up and down Britain today, around kitchen tables, in the pub, at work, conversation 
will turn, probably for the millionth time, to the problems of immigration: the 
unfairness people feel; the threats they see to their way of life. Does that make you a 
racist? No it does not. More often than not these are understandable and legitimate 
concerns. 
 
Q7 Nigel Farage: 
I think what’s been felt by millions of ordinary, decent working families, is wage 
compression. An unlimited supply of unskilled labour, that has made for many people, 
the minimum wage in effect the maximum wage… The vast majority of British people 
want change, they want to control, not just the quantity, but crucially also the quality 
of who come into this country. 
 
Q8 Ed Miliband: 
When people worry about the real impact immigration has, this Labour Party will 
always respond to those concerns, not dismiss them. It isn’t prejudiced to worry about 
immigration, it is understandable. So let me say how we will act to address peoples’ 
concerns. 
 
Here then, each speaker casts immigration in a frame of problems and fears – the 
nature of these fears sometimes being made explicit (lack of control, economic costs, 
loss of way of life – see the next section) and sometimes not. This framing  is 
attributed to the general population – sometimes simply cast as people, sometimes 
with the stress on ‘ordinary’ people (‘around kitchen tables, in the pub, at work’; 
‘ordinary… working families’). And it is stressed that the people making the claim as 
well as the claim itself is reputable both in the sense of being moral (‘ordinary, decent 
working families’) and rational (‘when people worry about the real impact 
immigration has’). David Cameron’s words speak for all when he asserts: ‘People 
have understandably become frustrated’. 
 
The word ‘understandably’ works in two ways here. It serves to validate the 
‘people’s’ concerns but also to signal that the speaker recognises and accepts what 
people are feeling. This takes us to the second step taken by each of the party leaders. 
They all lay considerable stress on the way in which they and their party not only 
understand the popular experience of immigration but that they have the will and the 
policies to deal with it (as already indicated in the Miliband extract above). They also 
insist that this distinguishes them from all their rivals and thereby renders them 
unique. 
 
Q9 David Cameron: 
And to the British people I say this. I share your concern [concerning limiting free 
movement of migrants in Europe], and I am acting on it. I know how much this 
matters. Judge me by my record in Europe. I promised we would cut the EU budget – 
and we have. I said I would veto a Treaty that was not in our interests, and I did. I do 
not pretend this will be easy. It won’t. It will require a lot of hard pounding, a lot of 
hard negotiation. But it will be worth it. Because those who promise you simple 
solutions are betraying you. 
 
Q10 Nick Clegg: 
We are finally getting to grips with the system; finally dealing with people’s concerns; 
finally building a system in line with our values - open hearted, generous spirited, but 
not open to abuse. I just hope the Liberal Democrats get another five years in 
Government so that we can see it through.  
 
Q11 Nigel Farage: 
We are the only party in British politics that is going to talk and address, honestly, an 
issue, that is for most people their number one concern in British politics. And 
perhaps it’s no wonder a recent opinion poll showed that we are now the most trusted 
party in British politics, to deal with this issue.  
 
Q12 Ed Miliband: 
Instead of false promises or false solutions, we will seek to offer clear, credible and 
concrete solutions which help build a country that works for you. And what we are 
doing on immigration is part of a plan for working people. 
 
Only the Conservatives have the commitment to offer realistic as opposed to simple 
solutions; only the Liberal Democrats have actually got round to implementing 
acceptable solutions; only UKIP is prepared to be honest about the problem and its 
solutions; only Labour will offer concrete solutions rather than false promises. But 
this is not all. As can be seen from Clegg’s extract here, the particular is elided with 
the general. Claims about Liberal Democrat approaches on immigration turn into a 
general claim about making real progress in building a system based on shared values 
and hence being grounds for electing the party to government.  
 
Cameron and Miliband do likewise. For Cameron, the question of immigration is 
emblematical of the realistic way that he works for the nation: “I have one test, and 
one test only: what is in the best, long term interests of Britain? That is the measure 
against which everything must be judged. If you elect me as Prime Minister in May, I 
will negotiate to reform the European Union, and Britain’s relationship with it. This 
issue of free movement will be a key part of that negotiation”. For Miliband, dealing 
with immigration is emblematic of the way of the practical way he works for ordinary 
people: “what we are doing on immigration is part of a plan for working people. 
Dealing with our debts, but never slashing and burning public services. 
A sensible approach on immigration, not false promises or false solutions”.  
 
Only Farage doesn’t make immigration emblematic of the general way in which the 
politician and his party relate to the electorate, but that is because there is nothing 
more general. Immigration (and its roots in membership of the EC) is the issue on 
which UKIP base their appeal. Accordingly, Farage’s peroration is a simple repetition 
of his arguments on this matter: “Britain needs to take back control of her borders, 
control of her immigration policy, and let us turn what has become a negative in our 
society into a positive. Only UKIP will argue for that in this general election”. 
 
In a number of ways, then, these texts contain intriguing elements: self-defined anti-
immigration set-piece speeches that laud immigration; speeches by would-be national 
representatives that (to the extent they can) parade outsider credentials; speeches by 
leaders which insist on how they are following the people. However, these various 
elements become intelligible if we bear two things in mind. The first is a strong public 
norm against displaying prejudice and racism and hence a powerful motivation not to 
be seen as prejudiced or racist (Plant & Devine, 1988), a motivation which is 
particularly strong for public figures who face rejection if they are seen to express 
racism (Blinder, Ford & Ivarsflaten, 2013).  
 
Accordingly, it is important for the speakers to deny that they are prejudiced against 
immigrants especially in a context where they might be open to such accusations by 
giving proposing stronger measures against immigration and immigrants. Thus they 
praise immigrants and immigration in general so as better to oppose a specific 
(contemporary) form of immigration. They parade their immigrant connections so as 
to make charges of prejudice against immigrants less plausible. 
 
Above all, all four leaders take a reactive stance in order to stress that the beliefs that 
count are not their own but that of the population. This takes us to our second point. 
Politicians are increasingly seen as part of an establishment elite who neither 
understand nor care about ordinary people (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018) – a perception 
which is particularly acute in the case of immigration policies (Ford & Goodwin, 
2014). That is, politicians as a group are largely perceived as outgroup to those who 
they seek to influence. Hence a politician’s ability to appear representative and 
achieve influence depends upon differentiating him/herself from negative stereotypes 
of ‘the political’: unlike ‘them’ I face up to problems, acknowledge the limitations to 
what I can do, don’t give promises I cannot keep or else offer solutions I know won’t 
work. By the same token, gaining advantage over their rivals depends upon showing 
that they do fit these stereotypes. They exemplify a political class who mislead people 
with ‘false promises or false solutions’ (Miliband, Q12). Only the speaker is a true 
and dedicated servant of the people who will do the ‘hard pounding’ (Cameron, Q9) 
necessary to produce ‘clear credible and concrete solutions’ (Miliband, Q12). 
 
So, those features of the speeches which seem odd when they are seen as simply 
focussed on intergroup relations become intelligible when one sees them as equally 
attuned to intra-group relations. Much time and rhetorical effort is devoted to assuring 
the audience that the speaker is not a typical politician, that they stand by the people, 
that they act for the people and that they deliver what the people have asked for. They 
and they alone have earned the right to represent the people. 
 
The ‘how’: Multiple constructions of threat 
As we have shown, much of the time the speeches define immigration as a problem 
without explaining what the problem is: for the purposes of being seen to be 
representative, it is enough for the people to see something as problematic for the 
politician to respond. However they do not entirely neglect to say what is problematic 
about immigration. Indeed all four leaders went into some detail here. That is, as 
expected, threat was critical to the issue of how British party leaders mobilised anti-
immigrant opinion.  
 
Let us start with the question of who immigration is a problem for. There is only one 
reference across all four speeches which mentions immigration as a problem for the 
country of origin. This is where Cameron asks: “can it be in the interests of central 
and eastern European Member States that so many of their brightest and best are 
drawn away from home when they are needed most?”. 
 
Two of the speakers, Clegg and Miliband, give brief mentions to the way that 
immigration can be a problem for immigrants. In a passage relating to illegal 
immigration, Clegg observes: “What we do know is the damage it does. The crime. 
The black economy. The slave labour. The beds-in-sheds. No real winners except 
rogue employers and dodgy landlords”.  Miliband states that: “There are truly 
shocking stories of people in Britain today having their wages stolen and having to 
live in the most appalling conditions”. He continues: “When people can be exploited 
for low wages or endangered at work, it drags the whole system down, undercutting 
the pay and conditions of local workers. We must end the epidemic of exploitation. 
We must stop people’s living standards being undermined by scandalous 
undercutting”.  
 
So, even when the problems for migrants are addressed, they are intertwined with 
problems for the host community. Cameron takes this a step further. He does invoke 
the notion of modern slavery and people trafficking when he asserts: “I am proud that 
today we are publishing our Modern Slavery Strategy, clamping down on those 
appalling criminals who try and traffic people here”. However he never explicitly 
mentions the suffering of immigrants and his broader concern is the impact of such 
abuses on the domestic population. Farage never makes even an implicit 
acknowledgement that immigrants might be victims. 
 
Overall, then, the overwhelming focus in the speeches is on immigrants as a problem 
for the British nation. There were at least four different ways in which ‘they’ were 
said to threaten ‘us’. The first is spatial threat according to which Britain is a small 
and overcrowded island in which we simply don’t have any for space for incomers. 
Although such an argument is rather common within the general immigration debate 
(Ipsos Mori, 2014; Migration Watch, 2017) it is only mentioned by Farage amongst 
our four leaders speeches:  
 
Q13 Nigel Farage: 
And also, just think about this, in what is already the most crowded country in 
Europe, the fact that we have to build one new dwelling every seven minutes, just to 
cope with current rates of immigration. 
 
The claim of over-crowding is obviously not absolute in the sense that there isn’t 
enough physical space in the country. Rather it is relative to the availability of 
resources, in this instance, houses. In this sense, notions of spatial threat elide into a 
second dimension: notions of economic threat.  Immigrants, it is claimed, put undue 
strain on our economic resources – sometimes houses, more typically public services 
(hospitals and schools in particular), welfare provision, jobs and wages. 
 
All four leaders mention some form of economic threat and there is one issue in 
particular which is used by each one to exemplify the notion that immigrants 
constitute an economic burden. This concerns the ability of people from other EC 
countries to claim benefits in the UK. It is claimed that such migrants – especially 
those from Eastern Europe - are attracted by and exploit an overly generous British 
benefits system.  For instance: 
 
Q14 David Cameron: 
No wonder so many people want to come to Britain. These tax credits and other 
welfare payments are a big financial incentive, and we know that over 400,000 EU 
migrants take advantage of them. This has got to change. So I will insist that in the 
future those who want to claim tax credits and child benefit must live here and 
contribute to our country for a minimum of four years. 
 
The only argument the other leaders have with this is the period before which benefits 
can be claimed. In ascending order: Clegg “There will be no coming to Britain and 
claiming out-of-work benefits on day one”; Miliband “People who come here won’t 
be able to claim benefits for at least two years”; Farage “[immigrants won’t] qualify 
for state benefits until they have been in the country for five years”. 
 
All four leaders also mention a third dimension of threat relating to the security of the 
ingroup. In 2014 this was tied less to fears of terrorism (though these were not 
entirely absent) and more to a threat of criminality. This takes two forms. The one is 
to stress how a large amount of immigration is illegal in and of itself. This theme is 
heavily stressed by the two leaders of parties in the then government coalition, 
Cameron and Clegg. The other is to stress how immigrants commit criminal acts. 
Thus Farage stresses the need to keep out immigrants “who have got a criminal 
record”. Often, however, the two are combined and elided. We have already seen a 
glimpse of this above when Clegg refers to ‘crime’ as part of the damage done by 
illegal immigration. It can also be seen in Cameron’s speech when he proposes: 
“stronger powers to deport criminals and stop them coming back. And tougher and 
longer re-entry bans for all those who abuse free movement including beggars, rough 
sleepers, fraudsters and people who collude in sham marriages”. The result of such 
constructions is that the taint of criminality hangs over all immigrants (cf. De Genova, 
2004) and that, even if not mentioned explicitly, the word ‘immigrant’ invokes the 
prefix ‘illegal’ and ‘asylum seeker’ the prefix ‘bogus’ (Every & Augustinos, 2008).  
 Thus far, these various forms of threat may compromise the collective interest, but 
they are not existential threats: that is, they leave the existence of the group intact. 
However the speeches invoke a fourth form of threat – diversity threat - albeit in a 
more indirect and coded form than what we have addressed thus far. Cameron, Clegg 
and Farage all refer to ‘change’ as one of the key problems posed by immigration: 
 
Q15 David Cameron 
(people feel) their community has changed too fast. 
 
Q16 Nick Clegg 
Some of our communities have undergone huge change over what is, relatively, a very 
short space of time 
 
Q17 Nigel Farage 
The people of this country are now deeply unhappy with… the changes that have 
happened within our communities 
 
Miliband does not mention change, rather, in a passage where he asserts that “People 
want there to be control of immigration. And I agree”, and where he also asserts that 
‘control’ means “fair rules when people get here”, he continues: 
 
Q18 Ed Miliband  Fair rules means people integrating into communities and learning 
English.  
 
In and of themselves, these extracts tell us little or nothing about the issues: in the 
case of change, what is being changed, what is causing the change and why should it 
matter. However, the speeches need to be read in a social and political context where 
specific terms can invoke a wider worldview (cf. Billig, 1988). This worldview is 
encapsulated by a headline in the Sun, the UK’s best selling newspaper on 4th 
December 2016: “Mass immigration to Britain has changed it beyond recognition and 
turned communities into ghettos”. That is, the ethnic and religious diversity of 
immigration (signalled in the term ‘ghetto’) has changed the ‘British way of life’ and 
replaced social cohesion with social division.  
 These ideas are not limited to the media, they have been articulated in more detail in 
previous speeches of some of the leaders themselves. Thus, in what was seen as a 
landmark speech and change of position, (a speech reported by the Daily Telegraph 
with the headline ‘Migration threatens our way of life’) David Cameron stated in 
April 2011: “real integration takes time. That's why, when there have been significant 
numbers of new people arriving in neighbourhoods, perhaps not able to speak the 
same language as those living there, on occasions not really wanting or even willing 
to integrate, that has created a kind of discomfort and disjointedness in some 
neighbourhoods” (BBC News, 2011).  
 
Or again, in a speech in Tooting on 14th December 2014, Ed Milband also signalled a 
hardening of position on immigration: “With many people coming here, especially 
from those countries new to the European Union, the last Labour government made 
mistakes. As I have said before, the capacity of our economy to absorb new migrants 
was greater than the capacity of some of our communities to adapt” (politics.co.uk, 
2012).  
 
Or, most graphically, from Nigel Farage on March 31st 2015, at an event to unveil 
new UKIP posters depicting the iconic White Cliffs of Dover desecrated by a set of 
three up escalators. Farage was responding to questioning by a journalist: “if we went 
to virtually every town up eastern England and spoke to people about how they felt 
their town or city had changed in the last 10 to 15 years there is a deep level of 
discomfort because when you have immigration at this sort of level then integration 
doesn’t happen.” (Mason, 2015). 
 
For sure, there are important differences between the speakers. Whereas Farage is 
more essentialist in suggesting that the inherent difference of immigrants makes their 
presence sufficient to make integration and cohesion impossible, Miliband is more 
explicit that the choices made by immigrants determine whether integration and 
cohesion is at risk (hence his emphasis in extract 18 on learning English). Equally, 
some speakers, like Miliband, see the problems of cohesion in terms of relations 
between ‘host’ and immigrant communities. Hence, in the Tooting speech cited above 
he stated: “Separation means isolation and you can’t succeed in Britain if you are 
isolated. Isolation also breeds ignorance and ignorance breeds suspicion and 
prejudice – and it sometimes even leads to community to turn on community” 
(politics.co.uk, 2014).  
 
Others, like Farage, contend that the problem operates within as well as between 
communities. Hence at the same poster unveiling as referenced above, he states: “I 
want to live in a community where our kids play football in the streets of an evening 
and live in a society that is at ease with itself. And I sense over the last decade or 
more we are not at ease.” (Hope & Bennett, 2015) 
 
In this context of shared knowledge, the mere mention that immigration creates 
change does then invoke an understanding of what is being changed (way of 
life/culture/identity), what is causing that change (ethnic and religious diversity) and 
why it matters (loss of cohesion, the replacement of trust and harmony with discord). 
The lack of elaboration in extracts 15 to 18 is not a sign of an under-developed 
position but precisely the opposite: the notion of immigration as a threat to 
community cohesion does not need to be spelled out for people because it is so well 
ingrained that they can spell it out for themselves. It is a sign of a consensual 
representation. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
This paper starts from a mobilisation perspective in order to address antagonism to 
immigration and opposition to free movement in Europe – ultimately the force which 
was central to the rise of anti-European populist movements that are now in power in 
several European countries, and specifically to the Brexit vote – developments which 
are the most potent forces for the disintegration of the European Union. We start from 
the premise that people do not adopt positions on immigration in isolation or simply 
through perception of its effects. In addition it is important to examine how their 
positions are mobilised by different actors, notably political leaders. Accordingly we 
address both why and how politicians advocate positions against free movement using 
an analysis of the set-piece speeches by British party leaders in the run up to the 2015 
British General Election. 
 All the speeches present immigration as a problem for the ‘British’ host community 
and advocate increased controls upon immigration both from inside and outside the 
EU. While there is occasional mention of problems for immigrants, this is limited and 
is normally paired with a discussion of how in turn this creates difficulties for the 
hosts (e.g. exploitation of ‘them’ leads to undercutting of ‘our’ jobs and wages). 
There is virtually no mention of any problems that immigration might pose for the 
countries of origin.  
 
Despite this relentless problematisation of a migrant outgroup for a national ingroup, 
large parts of the speeches are strangely quiet on the question of what these problems 
are. Indeed, ostensibly they present immigration as a boon and the speaker as highly 
positive towards immigrant. Nonetheless, they acknowledge that the audience sees 
immigration as a problem and stress their deference to the audience’s point of view. 
In so doing, they position the speaker as concerned with and attentive to this 
audience. They also focus on how the speaker has the will and the ability to respond 
to audience concerns. Furthermore they position the speaker as distinct from rival 
politicians in both respects. 
 
Part of the speeches, then, use the problems of immigration as a given against which 
the speakers seek to establish their relationship to the audience – or rather, to the 
category (Britishness) which encapsulates the audience. They align self with nation. 
They constitute themselves as being of the people, acting for the people and 
delivering to the people. And they do this as a means of gaining political authority 
and influence over the people (cf. Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2011; Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001).  
 
But this is not all of the speeches, because they do also turn to the question of the 
ways in which immigration is a problem for ‘us’. As we expected, the question of 
how our leaders invoke opposition to immigration is through constructions of threat. 
We identify four dimensions of threat: spatial, economic, security and diversity. The 
first three are differentiated from the fourth both in being non-existential and being 
explicit. Identity threat is existential, it is coded and it depends upon invoking tacit 
knowledge through ostensibly neutral terms (change). The first three are also 
differentiated from the fourth in that they are direct and unmediated. To lack space, 
lack resources or lack security is bad in and of itself. The argument about diversity 
threat is indirect and psychologically mediated. That is, it is not self-evident that 
diversity is inherently bad. Rather, the argument is that diversity undermines peoples’ 
sense of belonging to a unified community. This then leads to lack of trust and 
conflict. That is what is bad.  
 
This takes us to the issue of accountability which has been a theme running 
throughout our argument. Mostly, we have addressed the accountability of political 
actors in creating a sense of crisis over immigration, even as “the sense of a crisis 
about migration amongst countries of destination is wholly displaced” (Gollerkeri & 
Chhabra, 2016, p. 51). Indeed, these authors continue: “far from hordes of people 
coming many ageing economies might actually have to incentivize immigration even 
to attract low-skilled workers who will have better opportunities elsewhere” (p. 53). 
The fact that these politicians increasingly cry ‘crisis’ in such circumstances lends 
further substance to the argument that their talk has less to do with the actual position 
concerning immigration itself than with their own political positioning towards the 
electorate. 
 
So, let us remind ourselves of the words of John Kenneth Galbraith with which we 
began. More particularly let us reconsider the question he poses us: “What is the 
perversity in the human soul that causes people to resist so obvious a good (as 
immigration)”. Perversity, perhaps. But is it right to locate this perversity simply in 
the soul (or psyche) of the human individual? Our argument is that perversity is better 
located in political discourse and the ways in which this is used to achieve political 
authority. 
 
This is not to say that psychology is irrelevant to understanding antagonism to 
immigration. Our argument has centred on psychology at two levels. First, the way 
that political authority is rooted in group processes and, more specifically, the ability 
of leaders to position themselves as being of the group, acting for the group and 
delivering to the group. Second, the way that political discourse draws upon 
psychological assumptions – and particularly the assumption that diversity 
undermines group cohesion.  
 So, while our lens has been primarily focussed on the accountability of politicians in 
the immigration debate we cannot avoid focussing on ourselves as well and the ways 
in which the diversity-cohesion relationship is treated in psychological research. We 
do not have space at this point for such a review. But suffice it to say that, despite 
some claims that diversity undermines the formation of a shared social identity and 
therefore makes groups less cohesive, less harmonious, less productive and leaves 
members less satisfied (for a review, see van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007), there 
is growing acceptance that (a) there is no simple and general relationship between 
diversity (including diversity due to immigration) and cohesion (Hickman, Crowley & 
Mai 2008; Saggar, Somerville, Ford & Sobolewska, 2012), and (b) that in some 
circumstances diversity can increase group identification and cohesion, especially 
when it is consonant with group norms (van Knieppenberg, Haslam & Platow, 2007; 
Visintin, Green & Sarrasin, 2018). Clearly, though, the question of when diversity is 
or isn’t a problem for identification and cohesion is one that requires further 
clarification and we have a responsibility not only to conduct the relevant research but 
also to inject the public debate so as to contest the simplifications and distortions that 
currently characterise that debate. 
 
This is not the only area in which further analysis is needed. As we argued at the 
outset, this paper is intended as a mapping exercise, looking at the ways in which 
speakers define their own relationship, and the relationship of immigrants, to the 
national audience. In order to do that we employed an intensive qualitative 
methodology on a limited corpus of data (speeches by four British party leaders) 
which provided us with clear categories of analysis. Now we have these categories, 
then in order to examine the generalisability of what we have found, different 
approaches, such as survey methodology, would be more suitable.  
 
Equally, if we want to examine whether the constructions we have found are effective 
(both in creating support for the speaker and opposition to immigrants) then the 
outcomes of this study could feed in to future studies as the basis for experimental 
manipulations. In sum, the methods we have employed may be suitable for the present 
mapping stage of research, but overall validation of our mobilisation approach to 
immigration will be a multi-stage, multi-method process. 
 For now we conclude with the observation that, if the prospect of European 
integration is to be kept alive, we do need a psychology of attitudes to immigration 
and to a Europe of free movement. But it is a psychology which needs to ask very 
different questions – and hence which will deliver very different answers – from those 
which currently dominate the social psychological literature. 
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